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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WILLIAM J. COWAN, as administrator \
with the will annexed of the estate of 1
Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased, RICHARD H. MUMPER, EDWIN A. MESERVE, SHIRLEY E. MESERVE, WILLIAM J. COWAN, LESLEY D. W.
RITER, EDNA DAYTON, DAMARIS A.
BEEMAN, TRACY - COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation, BENEFICIAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, SARAH DAFT HOME, a cor- Case No.
7463
poration, R. C. GRANVILLE, and J. E.
BENEDICT, on behalf of themselves and
all other holders of Class 2 Preferred
Stock of Salt Lake Hardware Company,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
— vs. —
SALT LAKE HARDWARE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This action was commenced and prosecuted in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District of the
State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County, by owners
of second preferred shares of the defendant corporation to secure an adjudication by the courts of the right
of the defendant to call for redemption and to redeem
said shares of stock. The complaint states three causes
of action. By the first and third causes, plaintiffs seek
to have declared null and void and without legal effect
a purported amendment to the articles of incorporation
of defendant, whereby it is sought to make said
preferred shares redeemable at the pleasure of the
Board of Directors of defendant, and to restrain and
enjoin the defendant company, its officers, and directors
from redeeming or retiring, or attempting to redeem
and retire, said shares of second preferred stock owned
by the plaintiffs and one other owner who is not a party
to this action. By the second cause of action, plaintiffs
seek a judgment declaring the rights of the plaintiffs
and owners of said preferred shares and the rights and
duties of the defendant in respect thereto and, in particular, the plaintiffs ask that the judgment declare the
said purported amendment to the articles of incorporation of the defendant null and void insofar as it affects
the shares of preferred stock now issued and outstanding. The three causes of action allege in general the
identical facts, and they differ only with respect to the
legal theory and conclusions the pleader deduced from
them.
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At the trial each of the parties moved for judgment
on the pleadings. (R. 51, 52.) The fundamental facts
were not in dispute. The denials and traverses found in
the pleadings are denials of legal conclusions of the
opposing pleader, and are not denials of material facts,
concerning which there was and is no controversy.
The trial court granted the motion of defendant and
denied plaintiffs' motion (R. 63), and thereafter, formal
judgment, bearing date of January 6, 1950, denying
plaintiffs' motion and granting defendant's motion and
adjudicating the controversy in defendant's favor, was
signed, entered and filed. (R. 53, 54.) The plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court from this judgment. (R.
64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. For a considerable period of time prior to
November 10, 1947, there were twelve persons and corporations the owners and holders of 1826 shares of
class 2 preferred stock of the defendant corporation. At
the time of the commencement of this action a total of
1501 shares were owned and held by the plaintiffs in
this action, in the several separate ownerships alleged
in Paragraph IV of the complaint. (R. 02.) One A. F.
Tilton owned 325 shares, but she did not join in this
action. While this action was pending, one of the plaintiffs, Ethelbell M. Harmon, sold and transferred on the
books of the company 50 shares of her stock to Edna
Dayton, one of the original plaintiffs, 25 shares to R. C.
Granville, and 25 shares to J. E. Benedict. (R. 44, 45.)
3
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By order of Court made, entered and filed on December
28, 1948, the said Granville and Benedict were made
parties plaintiff in this action. (R. 42, 43.) The consequence of the transactions above related was to reduce
the ownership of Harmon's shares to 800; increase
Dayton's shares to 58; and add Granville and Benedict
as owners of class 2 preferred stock, each with ownership of 25 shares. The total number of shares, viz. 1501,
involved in this action, therefore remains the same. (R.
44,45.)
During the pendency of this action, to-wit on the
24th day of March, 1949, the plaintiff Ethelbell M. Harmon died in Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, State of
California. Upon application of Edwin A. Meserve, the
regularly appointed, qualified and acting Executor of
the Estate and under the Last Will and Testament and
codicils thereto of said Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased
(said appointment having been made in the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for Los Angeles
County), made and filed in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for
Salt Lake County, Probate Division, and after due
notice thereon, the said Last Will and Testament and
codicils thereto of said deceased were admitted to probate in the last mentioned Court, and WILLIAM J.
COWAN, of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah,
was appointed Administrator with the Will annexed of
the estate of said deceased. Said Cowan qualified as
such administrator with the will annexed. Based upon
stipulation of the parties hereto, the above entitled
4
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Court did by Order made, entered and filed on the 28th
day of J une, 1949, substitute said WILLIAM J. COWAN,
in his capacity aforesaid, as a party plaintiff in lieu of
said Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased, and the said Cowan,
in his capactiy aforesaid, did by formal instrument join
in and adopt the allegations of the complaint in the above
entitled action. (R. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.)
This action was instituted and prosecuted as a
representative action on behalf of all owners and holders
of Class 2 preferred stock of the defendant corporation.
That the present share ownership of the plaintiffs is as
follows:
Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased800 shares
Richard H. Mumper .......................
17 shares
Edwin A. Meserve .................................. 58 shares
Shirley E. Meserve
.................. ... 25 shares
William J. Cowan
50 shares
Lesley D. W. Riter
50 shares
Tracy-Collins Trust Co.
..
9 shares
Beneficial Life Insurance Co.
...... 100 shares
Sarah Daft Home .................................... 275 shares
Edna Dayton ............................................ 58 shares
Damaris A. Beeman
9 shares
R. C. Granville ......................................... 25 shares
J. E. Benedict
25 shares
(R. 44, 45)
2. After the commencement of this action, at a
special stockholders' meeting of the defendant corporation properly convened at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
March 16, 1948, the Articles of Incorporation of the defendant corporation were amended so as to extend the
corporate life for a period of five years after April .2,
5
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1948. Proper certificate of amendment was filed by the
defendant with the County Clerk of Salt Lake County,
Utah, and a copy of the certificate of amendment, duly
certified by the said County Clerk, was filed in the office
of the Secretary of State of the State of Utah on March
17, 1948. All of the shares of stock owned by the plaintiffs herein were voted in favor of adoption of said
amendment extending the corporate life of the company.
(R. 39, 40, 41.)
3. The defendant was organized as a corporation
under the laws of the State of Utah on the 4th day of
April, 1898, and Certificate of Incorporation was issued
by the Secretary of State of the State of Utah on that
date. (R. 03.) The capital of said company was fixed in
the sum of $200,000.00, divided into 750 shares of the
par value of $100.00 each of 10% non-callable preferred
stock having a total par value of $75,000.00; and 1,250
shares of a par value of $100.00 each of common stock
having a total par value of $125,000.00. The original
Articles of Incorporation provided:
"Upon dissolution of this corporation, after the
payment of all its debts, the remaining assets
shall be divided among the different classes of
stockholders according to their preferences, that
is to say: the preferred stock shall first be paid
in full, and the balance divided among the common stockholders pro rata." (R. 03.)
The duration of said corporation was for the period of
50 years from and after date of incorporation. (R. 03.)
The articles of incorporation on their face carried no
provision with respect to authority of the stockholders
6
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to amend the same. (E. 03.) The right of amendment,
if it exists, was and is dependent upon relevant statutory provisions. Therefore, the denial of the defendant
of the allegation contained in Paragraph V of the first
cause of action (B. 22), to-wit:
"Said original articles of incorporation were
silent with respect to authority of the stockholders to amend the same." (E. 03.)
is in effect the denial of a legal conclusion.
4. On December 7, 1900, there was filed in the office of the County Clerk of Salt Lake County, Utah, an
amendment to the articles of incorporation of the company (and a certified copy thereafter on December 11,
1900, was filed in the office of the Secretary of State of
the State of Utah, and on said last mentioned date the
Secretary of State issued his Certificate of Amendment)
whereby the capital stock of the company was increased
to the amount of $750,000.00, divided into 75,000 shares,
each of $100.00 par value. Of said amount $500,000.00
was represented by 5,000 shares of common stock, and
$250,000.00 was represented by 2,500 shares of preferred
stock. The preferred stock was further subdivided into
750 shares of class 1 preferred stock possessing a total
par value of $75,000.00 and entitled to a preference over
all other classes of stock of the company of 10% cumulative dividends, and 1,750 shares of class 2 preferred
stock with a total par value of $175,000.00 and entitled
to a preference over the common stock of 6% cumulative
dividends. There was no express provision in said
amendment making said preferred shares redeemable
7
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or callable. The defendant admits this statement, but
alleges as a legal conclusion that the stock above described was callable and redeemable. (R. 03, 04, 26.)
5. On April 20, 1907, after the defendant had complied with the relevant provisions of law, the Secretary
of State of the State of Utah issued his Certificate of
Amendment to the articles of incorporation of the defendant, whereby its capital stock was fixed in the
amount of $1,500,000.00 divided into 15,000 shares, each
of the par value of $100.00. Of said amount $1,110,000.00
was represented by 11,100 shares of common stock, and
the remaining capitalization, to-wit, $400,000.00 was
divided into 4,000 shares of preferred stock. Said preferred stock was further subdivided into 750 shares of
class 1 preferred stock possessing a total par value of
$75,000.00 and entitled to a preference over all other
classes of stock of the company of 10% cumulative dividends, and 3,250 shares of class 2 preferred stock possessing a total par value of $325,000.00 and entitled to
a preference over the common stock of 6% cumulative
dividends. This amendment contained no express provision making said preferred shares redeemable or callable. (R. 04, 26.) *
6. On December 2, 1916, the defendant further
amended its articles of incorporation in the manner required by law, and on the 5th day of December, 1916,
the Secretary of State of the State of Utah issued his
Certificate of Amendment whereby the capitalization
of the company was fixed in the amount of $2,000,000.00
divided into 20,000 shares each of $100.00 par value. Of
8
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said amount $1,350,000.00 was represented by 13,500
shares of common stock, and the remaining capitalization, to-wit $650,000.00, was divided into 6,500 shares of
preferred stock. Said preferred stock was further subdivided into 750 shares of class 1 preferred stock of a
total par value of $75,000.00 and entitled to a preference
over all other classes of stock of the company of 10%
cumulative dividends, and 5,750 shares of class 2 preferred stock possessing a total par value of $575,000.00
and entitled to a preference over the common stock of
6% cumulative dividends. This amendment contained no
express provision making the preferred shares redeemable or callable. (B. 05, 26.)
7. On March 2, 1922, after due compliance with
the relevant provisions of law by the defendant, the Secretary of State of the State of Utah issued his Certificate of Amendment to the articles of incorporation of
defendant, which amendment declared:
" Class 1 preferred stock may be retired or redeemed by the Board of Directors at any time
after the first day of January, 1923, at par plus
accrued dividends, and such stock may again be
issued and sold at par with preferred cumulative
dividends in an amount to be fixed by the Board
of not more than 6% per annum."
This amendment, however, contained no express provision making class 2 preferred stock redeemable or callable. (E. 05. 06, 27.)
8. At some unascertainable time, but long prior
to the commencement of this action, the Board of Directors of the defendant corporation redeemed and retired
9
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all of the class 1 preferred stock, and at the time of the
commencement of this action no class 1 preferred stock
was issued and outstanding. (R. 06, 27.)
9. At the times and on the occasions plaintiffs
and their predecessors in interest and ownership purchased and acquired the shares of class 2 preferred stock
described in plaintiffs' complaint, the articles of incorporation of the defendant authorized the issuance by
the defendant of class 2 preferred shares with preference as to dividends at the rate of 6j% per annum, cumulative; and the articles of incorporation further provided that if said shares of class 2 preferred stock were
outstanding upon the dissolution of defendant, they
would have preference in connection with the distribution of the assets of the defendant, as set forth in
Article XIII of the original articles of incorporation of
the defendant. At the time of the original issuance by
the defendant of said class 2 preferred shares, and until
the adoption of the amendment to defendant's articles
of incorporation hereinafter described in paragraph 10
hereof, the articles of incorporation of defendant, as
amended, contained no express provisions for the retirement or redemption of said class 2 preferred shares.
The denial by the defendant of allegations contained in
Paragraph XI of plaintiffs' first cause of action, to the
effect that the said class 2 preferred shares were issued
by the defendant without reserving to it the right or
privilege of retirement or redemption, constitutes a
denial of legal conclusions of plaintiffs' pleader, which
set forth his theory of the case. Further, the affirmative
10
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allegation of the defendant in Paragraph 8 of its answer,
to the effect that all of said shares of class 2 preferred
stock were issued by defendant company subject to the
right in the company, through action of its stockholders,
to amend its articles of incorporation as provided by
the statutes of the State of Utah so as to provide for
the calling and redemption of said preferred stock, also
constitutes a legal conclusion of the defendant, which in
turn declares its theory of this case. The plaintiffs
admit that there was no specific agreement or understanding made with them personally and individually by
the defendant that said shares of stock acquired by them
should remain permanent and unredeemable shares. The
allegation of this import contained in Paragraph XI of
plaintiffs' first cause of action is a conclusion based
upon the status of the articles of incorporation of the
defendant, and is not an attempt on the part of the
plaintiffs to assert that independent of the articles of
incorporation there was any particular personal agreement with them that the shares of class 2 preferred stock
would remain permanent and unredeemable. The present
plaintiffs did not acquire their shares of stock directly
from the company, but from mesne owners. (E. 06, 07,
27, 28.)
10. A special meeting of the stockholders of the
company was held at the office of the company in Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the 10th day of November, 1947, at
the hour of 5:15 o'clock P.M. That said meeting was
called and noticed as required by law, for the purpose
of considering amendments to the articles of incorpora11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tion of the company. At the time of said meeting there
were issued and outstanding 11,961 shares of the capital
stock of said company, of which amount 10,135 shares
were common stock and 1,826 shares were class 2 preferred stock. Represented at said meeting, either in
person or by proxy, were 9,823 shares of common stock
and 1,809 shares of class 2 preferred stock. Of the total
issued and outstanding common stock 312 shares were
not represented at said meeting, and of the total outstanding class 2 preferred stock 17 shares were not represented at said meeting, by formal power of attorney
or proxy. There was submitted for consideration by the
stockholders of the company assembled and represented
at said meeting, the following resolution:
" B E IT RESOLVED that the Articles of Incorporation of the Company be and they are hereby
changed and amended so as to make the Preferred Stock of the Company subject to call for
redemption, and redemption, at any time by
the Board of Directors, at par plus dividends
accrued to the date of redemption, by amending
Article VIII of the Articles of Incorporation of
this Company, as heretofore amended, so that
said article VIII will read as follows:
< ARTICLE VIII.
The limit of the capital stock of this corporation shall be $2,000,000.00, divided into 20,000 shares of the par value of $100.00 each,
of which 13,500 shares having an aggregate
par value of $1,350,000.00 shall be denominated
Common Stock, and 6,500 shares having an
aggregate par value of $650,000.00 shall be
denominated Preferred Stock; 750 shares of
i
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said Preferred Stock having an aggregate par
value of $75,000.00 shall be designated Class
One, and 5,750 shares of said Preferred Stock,
having an aggregate par value of $575,000.00
shall be designated as Class Two.
' The holders of Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, when and as declared, from
the surplus or net profits of the corporation,
yearly dividends at the rate of six per centum
per annum, and no more, payable on dates to
be fixed by resolution of the Board of Directors.
The dividends on the Preferred Stock shall be
cumulative, and shall be payable before any
dividends on the Common Stock shall be paid
or set apart; so that if in any year, dividends
amounting to six per centum shall not have
been paid thereon, the deficiency shall be payable before any dividends shall be paid or set
apart for the Common Stock.
' Whenever all cumulative dividends on the
Preferred Stock for all previous years shall
have been declared and shall have become payable and accrue dividends for the current year,
on the Preferred Stock shall have been declared, and the corporation shall have paid
such declared cumulative dividends for all previous years and such accrued dividends upon
the Preferred Stock for the current year, or a
sufficient amount for the payment thereof has
been set apart from the surplus or net profits,
the Board of Directors may declare dividends
upon the Common Stock, payable then and
thereafter out of the remaining surplus or net
profits.
'All Preferred Stock shall be subject to call
for redemption, and redemption, at any time
by the Board of Directors at par plus dividends
13
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accrued to the date of redemption, in such
amounts as from time to time the Board of
Directors may deterine, by paying to each
holder of said Preferred Stock so called for
redeption, or by depositing to the order of
such holder at the office of the Company or
at any bank in Salt Lake City, Utah, a sum
equal to the par value of the Preferred Stock
of such holder called for redemption, together
with accumulated and unpaid dividends thereon
to date of redemption. If only part of the
issued and outstanding Preferred Stock is
called for redemption, the same shall be redeemed and paid pro rata among all holders
of Preferred Stock outstanding.' " .
Upon motion duly made and seconded, the adoption
of said resolution was put to a vote, and thereafter the
Chairman of said meeting declared that the same had
been adopted by an affirmative vote of 9,823 shares of
stock represented at said meeting as against 1,809 shares
which were voted in opposition thereto. Said 9,823
shares voting in favor of said resolution were all common
shares represented at said meeting. No class 2 preferred
shares were voted in favor of said resolution. The negative vote of 1,809 shares was composed solely of class 2
preferred shares, which were owned as follows:
Ethelbell M. Harmon
900 shares
Hichard H. Mumper
17 shares
Edwin A. Meserve
58 shares
Shirley E. Meserve
25 shares
William J. Cowan
50 shares
Lesley D. W. Riter
.. 50 shares
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. .—
9 shares
Beneficial Life Insurance
Co
100 shares
14
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Sarah Daft Home
A. F. Tilton

.„

275 shares
325 shares

Total
l,809shares
The 17 shares of class 2 preferred stock not represented
at said meeting, either in person or by formal proxy,
were owned as follows:
Edna Dayton
8 shares
Damaris A. Beeman
9 shares
At said meeting the said Dayton and the said Beeman,
both plaintiffs herein, were in truth and in fact represented by their attorney and agent, Franklin Riter, Esq.,
who with permission of the Chairman of said meeting,
read into the records thereof a protest of said Dayton
and said Beeman against the adoption of said resolution.
Said Dayton and said Beeman have never consented or
approved the adoption of said resolution, and have at
all times dissented therefrom. (R. 07, 08, 09, 28.)
11. Acting under the authority and direction of
more than the majority, to-wit more than 2/3 of the
outstanding shares of stock of the defendant, the defendant by and through the President and Secretary of its
Board of Directors filed with the Clerk of Salt Lake
County, Utah, on the 12th day of November, 1947, in
conformity with the laws of the State of Utah, a certificate setting forth the amendment to the articles of incorporation of the defendant adopted in the form of
the resolution set forth in Paragraph 10, supra. On the
13th day of November, 1947, a certified copy of said
amendment was filed in the office of the Secretary of
State of the State of Utah, and on said last mentioned
15
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date the Secretary of State issued his Certificate evidencing such amendment. The said amendment authorizes the Board of Directors of the defendant to call for
redemption and retirement the class 2 preferred stock
outstanding and owned by plaintiffs in the several
amounts hereinabove set forth in Paragraph 1 hereof.
The denials contained in Paragraph 10 of defendant's
answer, denying that the said last mentioned amendment
to the articles of incorporation is null and void and without legal effect, and the denial by defendant of plaintiffs ' allegation that the adoption of said amendment by
a majority of the stockholders of the defendant was not
authorized by law, are denials of legal conclusions set
forth in plaintiffs' complaint. Likewise, defendant's
assertion contained in Paragraph 10 of its answer, that
said amendment was and is authorized by the statutes
of Utah, is also the allegation of a legal conclusion. The
further denials of defendant contained in Paragraph 10
of its answer, of plaintiffs' assertion that Sections 338
and 339, Revised Statutes of Utah of 1898, as amended,
do„ not authorize the amendment adopted by defendant's
stockholders on November 10, 1947, without the consent
of the owners of all of the outstanding class 2 preferred
stock; and the further denial by defendant of plaintiffs'
contention that said sections are unconstitutional or null
and void as to plaintiffs, in that if said statutes are construed to authorize said amendment without the plaintiffs' consent, it impairs the contract rights of plaintiffs
in derrogation of federal and state constitutional provisions, are denials of plaintiffs' legal conclusions, which
16
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set forth their theory of their case against defendant.
The denial of defendant of plaintiffs' claim of right to
own and retain their several shares of class 2 preferred
stock free and exempt from the privilege of redemption
by defendant, as a vested contract or property right, is
also a denial by defendant of a conclusion contained in
plaintiffs' complaint. The allegations of plaintiffs that
they or their predecessors in ownership and interest acquired said shares of stock upon the agreement or
covenant of the company that said shares were not
subject to redemption or retirement, is an allegation
denied by defendant, but in view of the plaintiffs' position hereinabove set forth with respect to the nature of
this agreement there is no issue of fact here involved. (R.
09, 10, 28, 29.)
12. Under the authority of said amendment adopted
on November 10, 1947, the officers and directors of defendant have expressed and announced their intention
to call for redemption and retirement all of the class 2
preferred stock of defendant, at par plus accrued dividends to date of redemption, and defendant will assert
and claim the right to call for redemption and to redeem
the shares of stock owned by plaintiffs, and it will after
such call for redemption refuse to recognize the owners
and holders of class 2 preferred stock as stockholders of
defendant. (R. 11, 30.)
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
At the time the defendant was organized, on April
4, 1898, there was and there still is in effect the follow17
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ing provision of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
to-wit:
1. Constitution of the State of Utah
(a) "Corporations may be formed under
general laws, but shall not be created by special
acts. All laws relating to corporations may be
altered, amended or repealed by the Legislature,
and all corporations doing business in this State,
may, as to such business, be regulated, limited
or restrained by law." (Article XII, Section 1.)
STATUTORY REFERENCES
1. There was at the time defendant was incorporated in full force and effect Section 338, Title 11,
Chapter 1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, effective
January 1, 1898, reading as follows, to-wit:
"338. The articles of incorporation of any
corporation now existing or that hereafter may
be organized under the laws of this state may
be amended in any respect conformable to the
provisions of this chapter by a vote representing
at least two-thirds of the outstanding capital
stock thereof at a stockholders' meeting called
for that purpose, as hereinafter prescribed; provided, that the original purpose of the corporation shall not be altered, nor shall the capital
stock be diminished to an amount less than fifty
per cent in excess of the indebtedness of the
corporation; and provided further, that the liability of the holder of full-paid capital stock for
assessments or for the indebtedness of the corporation shall not be changed without the consent of all the stockholders."
2. Section 338, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898,
remained a part of the Statutes of the State of Utah,
18
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unchanged, until it was amended by Chapter 94, Session
Laws of Utah, 1903, to read as follows:
"338. The articles of incorporation of any
corporation now existing or that hereafter may
be organized under the laws of this State may
be amended in any respect conformable to the
laws of this State by a vote representing at least
two-thirds of the oustanding capital stock thereof
at a stockholders' meeting called for that purpose as hereinafter prescribed. Provided, that
the original purpose of the corporation shall not
be altered, nor shall the capital stock be diminished to an amount less than fifty per cent in
excess of the indebtedness of the corporation;
and provided, further, that the personal or individual liability of the holder of full-paid capital
stock for assessments or for the indebtedness or
obligations of the corporation shall not be changed
without the consent of all of the stockholders."
3. Section 338, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as
amended by Chapter 94, Session Laws of Utah, 1903, and
as amended by an act approved March 3, 1905, was further amended by Chapter 131, Session Laws of Utah,
1905, to read as follows:
"338. The articles of incorporation of any
corporation now existing or that hereafter may
be organized under the laws of this State may be
amended in any respect conformable to laws of
this State by a vote representing at least a majority in amount of the outstanding capital stock
thereof at a stockholders' meeting called for
that purpose, as prescribed in Section 339 of the
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as amended by
chapter 94, laws of Utah, 1903; provided, that if
all the stockholders vote in favor of such amend19
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ment at any meeting of the stockholders, the
notice required by Section 339 aforesaid need not
be given; and provided further that the original
purpose of the corporation shall not be altered
or changed without the approval and consent of
all the outstanding stock; provided further, that
the adding to the purposes or object, or extending the power and business of the corporation,
shall not be deemed a change of the original purpose of the corporation; provided, further, that
the capital stock of the corporation shall not be
diminished to an amount less than fifty per cent
in excess of the indebtedness of the corporation;
and provided further, that the personal or individual liability of the holder of full-paid capital
stock for assessments or for the indebtedness or
obligation of the corporation shall not be changed
without the consent of all the stockholders.''
4. Section 338 was carried into the Compiled Laws
.of Utah, 1917, as Section 886 therein and continued in
force unchanged until amended by Chapter 16, Session
Laws of 1919 in matters not relevant here, and by Chapter 22, Session Laws of 1921 to read as follows:
"886. The articles of incorporation of any corporation now existing or that hereafter may be
organized under the laws of this state may be
amended in any respect conformable to the laws
of this state by a vote representing at least a
majority in amount of the outstanding stock
thereof at a stockholders' meeting called for that
purpose as prescribed in Section 887; provided,
that if all the stockholders vote in favor of such
amendment at any meeting of the stockholders,
the notice required by Section 887 aforesaid need
not be given; and provided further, that the original purpose of the corporation shall not be al20
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tered or changed without the approval and consent of all the outstanding stock; provided further, that the adding to the purposes or object
or extending the power and business of the corporation, shall not be deemed a change of the
original purpose of the corporation; provided
further, that the capital stock of the corporation
shall not be diminished to an amount less than
fifty per cent in excess of the indebtedness of
the corporation; and, provided further, that the
personal or individual liability of the holder of
full-paid stock for assessments or for the indebtedness or obligation of the corporation shall not
be changed without the consent of all the stockholders. "
5. Section 886, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as
amended as aforesaid by Session Laws of Utah 1919 and
Session Laws of Utah 1921, has been carried further into
Utah Code Annotated 1943 and is now in full force and
effect as Section 18-2-44, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
which reads as follows:
"The articles of incorporation of any corporation now existing or that hereafter may be organized under the laws of this state may be
amended in any respect conformable to the laws
of this state in such manner and by the vote of
such proportion of all or any class or classes of
stock as the articles of incorporation may provide; and in case the articles of incorporation
do not so provide, by a vote representing at least
a majority in amount of the outstanding stock
thereof entitled to vote at a stockholders' meeting called for that purpose as prescribed in Section 18-2-45; provided, that, if all the stockholders
entitled to vote vote in favor of such amendment at any meeting of the stockholders, the
21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

notice required by section 18-245 need not be
given; and 'provided further, that the original
purpose of the corporation shall not be altered
or changed without the approval and consent of
all the outstanding stock, but the adding to the
purposes or object or extending the power and
business of the corporation shall not be deemed
a change of the original purpose of the corporation; provided further, that no amendment shall
be made which shall have the effect of reducing
or of authorizing the reduction of the capital,
subscribed or paid in, of the corporation to an
amount less than fifty per cent in excess of the
indebtedness of the corporation; and provided
further, that the personal or individual liability
of the holder of full-paid stock for assessments
or for the indebtedness or obligations of the corporation shall not be changed without the consent of all the stockholders.''
ARGUMENT
I.
THE RESERVED POWER OF AMENDMENT
CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH AND IMPLEMENTED BY SEC.
338, TITLE 11, CHAP. 1, R. S. OF UTAH 1898 (OPERATIVE ON DATE OF INCORPORATION OF
DEFENDANT) AND SEC. 18-2-44, UTAH CODE
1943 (OPERATIVE ON DATE OF THE QUESTIONED AMENDMENT TO DEFENDANT'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION) DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE AMENDMENT TO DEFENDANT'S
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION CONVERTING
NON-CALLABLE AND NON^REDEEMABLE PRE22
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PEERED STOCK TO CALLABLE AND.REDEEMABLE PREFERRED STOCK.
1. The power reserved by the State of Utah in its constitution and statutes to amend, alter or repeal all laws
relating to corporations was the result of the Dartmouth
College case, and such reservation was and is intended
to eliminate the results of said decision.
2. The reservation of power to amend, alter or repeal corporation laws protect the relationship between the state
and the corporation and is to be exercised in matters
of public concern and welfare. The reservation of power
when properly construed does not appertain to the relationship between the corporation and its stockholders or
between the stockholders inter se.

1. The power reserved by the State of Utah in its constitution and statutes to amend, alter or repeal all laws
relating to corporations was the result of the Dartmouth
College case, and such reservation was and is intended
to eliminate the results of said decision.
The proper orientation of the issues in this case
can only be made by due consideration to the holding
of the United States Supreme Court in Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 638, 643; 4 Law
Ed. 629. The following quotation from Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion is pertinent :
"The benefit to the public is considered as an
ample compensation for the faculty it confers,
and the corporation is created. If the advantages
to the public constitute a full compensation for
23
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the faculty it gives, there can be no reason for
exacting a further compensation by claiming a
right to exercise over this artificial being, a
power which changes its nature and touches the
fund, for the security and application of which
it was created. There can be no reason for implying in a charter given for a valuable consideration, a power which is not only expressed, but
is in direct contradiction to its express stipulat i o n s . From the fact, then, that a charter of
incorporation has been granted, nothing can be
inferred which changes the character of the institution, or transfers to the government any new
power over it. The character of civil institutions
does not grow out of their incorporation, but out
of the manner in which they are formed, and the
objects for which they are created. The right to
change them is not founded on their being incorporated, but on their being the instruments of
government, created for its purposes. . . . This
is plainly a contract to which the donors, the
trustees and the crown (to whose rights and obligations New Hampshire succeeds) were the original parties. It is a contract made on a valuable consideration. It is a contract for the
security and disposition of property. It is a
contract, on the faith of which, real and personal
estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It
is, then, a contract within the letter of the constitution, and within its spirit also."
This decision has been the subject of discussion and
comment by Courts and text writers through the years.
Many diverse opinions were held at one time or another
concerning its operative effect. The final word on the
subject, however, is expressed by Fletcher as follows:
"The true view is that the power to alter,
24
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amend, or repeal charters is reserved by the state
'solely' for the purpose of avoiding the effect
of the decision in the Dartmouth College Case;
that the charter of a corporation is a contract
between the state and the corporation within the
constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and that the purpose of the reservation is to enable the state to
impose such restraints upon corporations as the
legislature may deem advisable for the protection of the public. Such power is not reserved in
any sense for the benefit of the corporation, or
of a majority of the stockholders, upon any idea
that the legislature can alter the contract between the corporation and its stockholders, nor
for the purpose of enabling it to do so. If this
view is sound — and that it is so seems clear —
the power of the majority of the stockholders to
bind a dissenting minority by accepting an amendment of the charter does not depend at all upon
whether the state has reserved the power to alter
or amend the charter, but depends essentially
upon the question whether the change is of such
character that it may be deemed so far in furtherance of the original undertaking, and incidental to it, as to be fairly within the power of
the corporation to bind its individual members
by its corporate assent, or whether it is such a
departure from the original purpose that no
member should be deemed to have authorized the
corporation to assent to it for him." (Emphasis
supplied.) (13 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation—
Permanent Edition—Section 5776, Pages 85-87.)
(Cf: 3 Clark & Marshall, Private Corporations,
Section 631f.)
The above stated conclusion of Fletcher is fully supported by authorities cited by him.
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The following comments may also be appropriately
considered:
" I t has been said that the charter of a private
corporation operates on a three-fold relationship to establish a contract between the State and
the corporation, between the corporation and its
stockholders, and between the stockholders and
the State, and that it also constitutes a contract
between the stockholders inter se." (12 C. J.,
Section 648, pp. 1023-24.)
"As the courts have not agreed as to what
amendments are or are not so material or fundamental that they cannot be assented to by a
majority of the stockholders or members so as
to bind the minority, there is as to some amendments a direct conflict in the decisions. Among
the amendments which have been held to be so
fundamental as to require unanimous assent are:
• Amendments which are not in relation to matters
which concern the public, but which change the
rights of the stockholders or members inter se,
as by changing the method of voting at corporate
meetings; amendments authorizing a corporation
to engage in a fundamentally different business
or enterprise from that for which it was created;
authorizing a change from a mutual insurance
company to a joint-stock company, thus impairing the rights of the policyholders and members;
converting a gas and electric lighting company
into a street railway company; authorizing a corporation organized to manufacture preserves,
syrups, and the like, to engage in the sale of
liquor; authorizing a railroad, turnpike, or toll
road company to materially change the termini,
location, or route of its road, or to extend its
road to such an extent as to materially change
the original enterprise; conferring upon a rail-
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road company the privilege of selling its road;
authorizing a lease of corporate property to another corporation for nine hundred and ninetynie years; authorizing a subdivision of the corporation; authorizing corporations to consolidate; making non-assessable full-paid stock assessable; increasing the capital stock; reducing
the minimum number of subscribed shares, thus
rendering a shareholder liable, who otherwise
would not be; or authorizing the creation of preferred stock and compelling the stockholders to
surrender their common stock and take the preferred stock in lieu thereof.'' (14 C. J., Section
194, pp. 189-190.)
" I t is not important to inquire into the original
reason for the reservation of this power to
amend, but it has been judicially suggested that
it was due to the desire on the part of individual
states to escape the effect of the decision in the
Dartmouth College Case. Indeed, Mr. Justice
Story in his separate opinion suggested this as a
method by which the states might avoid the effect
of such a doctrine. Even before the Dartmouth
College case, the supreme court of Massachusetts
intimated such a reservation would save to the
state its power to control corporations. And the
New Jersey court said that 'the object and purpose of these provisions are so plain, and so
plainly expressed in the words, that it seems
strange that any doubt should be raised concerning it. It was a reservation to the state, for the
benefit of the public, to be exercised by the state
only. The state was making what had been decided to be a contract, and it reserved the power
of change, by altering, modifying or repealing the
contract. Neither the words nor the circumstances nor apparent objects for which this provision was made, can, by any fair construction,
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extend it to giving power to one part of the corporators as against the other, which they did not
have before. It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth College case.' This principle of the reserved power to amend proceeds on the theory
that such reservation is incorporated in the charter, and that it qualifies the grant, and hence any
subsequent exercise of such reserved power cannot be regarded as an act within the prohibition
of the constitution. The right to amend under
such reserved power is unquestioned." (Thompson on Corporations, Third Edition, Section 431,
pp. 545-546.)
''The exercise of the power of amendment under
the right reserved either by statute or constitution cannot be arbitrary or unlimited. This reserved power must be exercised within the scope
of the original charter. Under it the nature and
purposes of the corporation cannot be changed;
they can only be amended. It is conceded that
under this reserved power the state may tender
what in its opinion is a proper amendment, and
require its acceptance, or compel a cessation of
business. Thus, it was said by the United States
Supreme Court that ' such a reservation, it is
held, will not warrant the legislature in passing
laws to change the control of an institution from
one religious sect to another, or to divert the
fund of the donors to any new use inconsistent
with the intent and purpose of the charter, or
compel subscribers to the stock, whose subscriptions are conditional, to waive any of the conditions of the contract.' In a much later case the
court again said: 'The effect of such a provision,
subject to which a charter is accepted, is, at least,
to reserve to the legislature the power to make
any alteration or amendment of a charter subject
to it, which will not defeat or substantially im-
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pair the object of the grant, and which the legislature may deem necessary to carry into effect
the purposes of the grant, or to protect the rights
of the public or of the corporation, its stockholders or creditors, or to promote the due administration of its affairs.' It has been said that
under this power the legislature can do no more
than to waive the public rights; that it cannot
divert or impair the rights of shareholders as
between themselves, as it is upon the faith of
stipulations contained in the charter that the
shareholders become subscribers and make themselves members of the corporation. * * * "
(Thompson on Corporations, Third Edition, Section 438, pp. 555-556.)
"And it is equally clear that, if the State has
not reserved the power to alter, amend, or repeal
the charter of the Corporation, or if, although
there is such a reservation, it is to be construed
as is held by most courts, as intended merely for
the protection of the public, and not for the purpose of enabling the legislature to change the
contract between the corporation and its stockholders, the legislature has no power to authorize a majority of the stockholders to bind the
minority by accepting such amendment; for this
would be to impair the obligation of the contract
between the corporation and the dissenting stockholders, by forcing them into a different contract, and therefore would be within the constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the
obligation of contracts.'' (3 Clark & Marshall,
Private Corporations, Section 631f.)
" # * * Any attempt to use the power of amendment for the purpose of authorizing a majority
of the stockholders to force upon the minority
a material change in the enterprise is contrary
to law, and against the spirit of justice. Under
29
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such reserved power the legislature has only that
right to amend the charter which it would have
had in case the Dartmouth College case had decided that the federal constitution did not apply
to corporate charters. * *•* The power to make
given to the legislature. The legislature may
repeal the charter, but cannot force any stockholder into a contract against his will. * * * The
best view taken of this reserved power of the
State is that under it a fundamental amendment
of the charter does not authorize a majority of
the stockholders to accept the amendment and
proceed, but that the unanimous consent of the
a new contract for the stockholders is not thereby
stockholders is necessary." (Cook on Corporations, Fifth Edition, Section 501.)
It is submitted that the doctrine of the Dartmouth
College case, as interpreted above, definitely limits the
operative effect of Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution of the State of Utah, which declares that "All
laws relating to corporations may be altered, amended,
or repealed by the legislature * * *," of Sec. 338, RS
1898 and of Sec. 18-2-44, U. C. 1943.
2. The reservation of power to amend, alter or repeal corporation laws protect the relationship between the state
and the corporation and is to be exercised in matters
of public concern and welfare. The reservation of power
when properly construed does not appertain to the relationship between the corporation and its stockholders or
between the stockholders inter se.
There is a certain aspect of the decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in Garey, et al, vs. St Joe Mining
Company, 32 Ut., 497, 91 Pac.'369, 12-LEA (N.S.) 554,
which should be considered in interpreting the Consti-

30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tutional provision and statutes involved in this action.
Both Salt Lake Hardware Company and St. Joe
Mining Company were organized under the statutory
provisions of similar legal effect. Salt Lake Hardware
Company was organized on April 4, 1898; St. Joe Mining
Company in 1897. At the time of the organization of
the St. Joe Mining Company, Laws of Utah, 1896 at
p. 30 (Sec. 2273) provided in pertinent part:
"The capital stock of any corporation * * * may
be increased * * * or such capital stock may be
diminished. The name of such corporation may
be altered, the number of its directors, or officers be changed * * * the articles of agreement
or incorporation may be otherwise changed or
amended; provided such amendment does not
alter the original purpose of the corporation."
The foregoing provision was redrafted and appeared in
E. S. Utah 1898 as Sec. 338 as above set forth in paragraph 1 of Statutory References, supra.
The Utah law at the time of the incorporation of
both companies authorized the articles of incorporation
to be amended "in any respect" (Salt Lake Hardware
Co.) or to "be otherwise changed or amended" (St.
Joe Mining Co.).
The St. Joe case held that the conversion of nonassessable shares into assessable shares was not authorized by the statute, and if it were construed as to
authorize such action, the statute would impair the
obligations of contract (Utah Constitution, Art I, Sec.
18; Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec, 10) or would deprive the stockholder of his property without due
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process of law (Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7; Federal Constitution, 14th Amendment) and therefore would
be void. The following quotation from the St. Joe decision is relevant:
"From the texts and the cases it will be seen
that under the reservation the state is not only
unauthorized to alter or amend charters of existing corporations in such a way as will change the
fundamental character of the corporation, impair
the object of the grant, or rights vested thereunder, but it is also unauthorized to alter or
amend them in such a way as will impair the
contractual relations or rights of the stockholders among themselves, or between the corporation and its stockholders; and it will also be
seen that under the reserved power the Legislature has only the right to amend the charter,
or laws with respect thereto, which it would
have had in the event it had been decided in the
Dartmouth College case that the federal Constitution did not apply to corporate charters. The
Dartmouth College case did not call in question
nor involve any right or relation of the corporators among themselves. It involved only the relation of the corporation and the state. Without
the reservation it was held that even such relation cannot be changed without doing violence to
the federal Constitution. Because of the reserved
power the state may now amend or alter the
charter, so far as effecting the contract with itself, and so long as it does not change the fundamental character of the corporation or impair
any vested rights acquired thereunder. But, as
stated by the authorities, the right is reserved
for the benefit of the state and of the public and
for public purposes. The power can only be exercised to the extent that the state is interested.
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It can alter or modify any right, privilege, or
immunity granted by it. It cannot, however, reach
out and impair the obligations of contracts existing between the corporation and its members, or
among the corporators themselves, any more than
it can impair the obligations of contracts existing between other individuals. Undoubtedly it
may take away altogether the franchise and privileges granted under it. The exercise of such
powers pertain directly to its contract, and was
expressly reserved to the state, and with reference to which every stockholder subscribed for
or purchased his stock. So under the reserved
power, the Legislature may make such reasonable amendments or alterations as it may deem
necessary to carry into effect the purposes of
the grant, or to protect the rights of the public,
or of the incorporation and its stockholders, or
to promote the due administration of its affairs,
when such amendments or alterations will not
defeat or substantially impair the object of the
grant or any vested rights. Independent of the
reservation there are many things which the state
may do in the exercise of its police powers towards regulating and restricting corporate powers and functions. When reasonably exercised,
such legislative enactments do not fall within the
prohibition of the federal Constitution."
The line of reasoning of the St. Joe case finds
support and elaboration in a most respectable and impressive line of authorities:
"Norris vs. American Pub. Utilities Co. (1923)
14 Del., Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 was a suit to declare
void an amendment to defendant's certificate of
incorporation, by the terms of which it was
provided (1) that two new classes of preferred
33
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stock be created, having preference over the original preferred stock; (2) that accumulated dividends accrued and unpaid on the original preferred stock be canceled; (3) that the original
redemption figure of $105 on the preferred stock
be reduced to $100; (4) that the preferred stock's
right be taken away. In respect of the first change
it was held that since the Delaware Corporation
Law, under which defendant was organized, authorized changes in the corporate charter affecting the preferences granted to preferred stock,
the creation of two new classes of preferred stock
superior to the original preferred stock was authorized, since such change merely affected the
preference rights of the original preferred stock.
The third change was upheld under another section of the Corporation Law providing: 'Any or
all classes of preferred stock * * * may be made
subject to redemption at such time or times, and
at such price, not less than par, as may be expressed in the certificate of incorporation, or any
amendment thereof;' and the fourth alteration
was permitted under the general clause of the
statute permitting a corporation to make 'any
other change or alteration in its charter of incorporation that might be desired.' However, it
was held in respect of the cancellation of the
unpaid accrued dividends that they represented
vested rights of the preferred stockholders which
could not be impaired under either the portions
of the statute referring to preference rights or
under the general clause."
Yoakam vs. Providence Biltmore Hotel Company,
(1929) D.C. 34 Fed. (2d) 533: This case holds that under
a statute providing that any corporation may amend its
charter "by making any other change or alteration in
34
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

its charter or incorporation that may be desired," that
the corporation was not authorized to amend its charter
in such manner as would cancel the obligation undertaken by the corporation under its original Certificate
of Incorporation, to set aside $20,000.00 annually as a
sinking fund for the purchase or redemption of preferred stock.
Pronic vs. Spirits Distributing Company, (1899) 58
N.J. Eq. 97, 42 Atlantic 586: The statute under which
the defendant was organized authorized it "to amend
its original certificate with the assent of a majority in
interest of the stockholders." The defendant attempted
to amend its certificate by reducing the dividend rate on
the first preferred stock from 7% to 6%, and from 6%
to 2% on the second preferred stock. The Court held
such amendments invalid. The Court said:
" I n my judgment these general powers of
amendment of the certificate which originally
fixed the relation between the stockholders inter
sese do not confer the power of altering the previous contract of the company itself with the
stockholder as to the rate of dividend which was
granted by a stock certificate or contract of the
company, which was required by the statute to
express this rate of dividend, and which reserved
no power of the company to change. Such alteration would impair the obligation of the contract created by the stock certificate issued under
the company charter."
Keller vs. Wilson & Company, (1936) Del. 190 Atl.
115; {Delaware Chancery Court) 180 Atl. 584. Section
26 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware author35
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ized amendments to corporate charters, increasing or
decreasing the authorized capital stock or changing the
common par value, designation, preferences or relative
participating option or other special rights of the shares.
The Court held that this statute was prospective in
operation, and that any amendment which destroyed
the rights of holders of cumulative preferred stock to
accrued and unpaid dividends was not within its authorization.
Consolidated Film Industries vs. Johnson, (1937)
Del. 197 Atl. 489: The defendant adopted an amendment to its certificate of incorporation which provided
that the existing preferred stock, on which there were
dividends accrued and unpaid, should "become and be,
and shall be surrendered and exchanged for" other preferred stock entitled to a lower dividend rate. The
Court held that the corporation had no power under the
statute mentioned in the Keller case supra to compel
the plaintiff, who held some of the original preferred
stock to forfeit his rights to accrued dividends.
Breslav vs. New York & Queens Electric Light &
Power Company, (1936) 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N.Y.S.
932, affirmed without opinion (1937) 273 N.Y. 593, 7
N.E. (2d) 708: A New York statute authorized corporations "to classify or re-classify any shares, either with
or without par value." The corporation, by an amendment to its charter, provided that certain non-callable
preferred stock would be callable at a given figure. The
Court said: ..
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"However, this reserved power is not unlimited, and its exercise is subject to the restrictions
and restraints imposed by other provisions of
the State and Federal Constitutions. Due process
of law must be observed, and vested property
rights and the obligation of contracts must not
be destroyed or impaired. Coombes v. Getz, 285
U. S. 434, 52 S. Ct. 435, 76 L. Ed. 866; Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629, 56 S. Ct.
611, 80 L. Ed. 943. While limitations on the
amending power cannot be reduced to fixed rules,
the following cases illustrate what amendments
constitute an improper exercise of the reserved
power * # #
"If a stockholder may not be deprived of his right
to vote for all the directors [Lord v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States, 194
N. Y. 212, 237, 87 N. E. 443, 22 L. R. A. (NS)
420] or his right to payment on the named redemption date [Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works,
276 Mich. 200, 267 N. W. 815, 105 A.L.R. 1447],
or may not be denied his right to a voice in the
management of a corporation [Page v. American
and British Manufacturing Co., 129 App. Div*
346, 113 N.Y.S. 734], or to the continuance of a
sinking fund set up for the payment of his stock
[Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co. (DC),
34 Fed. (2d) 533, 546] and if a majority may not
make his non-assessable stock assessable [Garey
v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369,
12 LEA (NS) 554]—because to do any of these
acts would result in impairing his contract or
taking his property without due process of law,
or both — surely his right to remain a stockholder as long as the company exists is entitled
to equal protection and for the same reasons. Obviosuly the proposed amendment is not designed
to protect any rights of the public, nor does it
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concern the policy of the state, nor does it regulate or control the internal management of the
corporation as far as it has relation with the
state.''
A. C Frost <& Company vs. Coeur d'Alene Mines
Corporation, (1939) Idaho 92 Pac. (2d) 1057: In this
case the defendant, by amendment to its articles of incorporation, attempted to convert non-assessable stock
to assessable stock. Reliance was placed upon the act
of the legislature which authorized corporations to
change non-assessable to assessable stock, although
adopted after date of incorporation of the company.
The Court construed the statute as not including power
to effect such amendment, and cited with approval the
St. Joe case from Utah.
Johnson vs. Tribune-Herald Company, 155 Ga. 204,
116 S.E, 810 involved an amendment to the charter of
a corporation effected by a majority of the stockholders,
in the face of opposition by minority stockholders,
whereby it was proposed to convert non-callable preferred stock into callable and redeemable shares. The
Court in declaring such amendment invalid said:
" I t is now well settled in this state that when
proposed amendments to a charter are fundamental, radical, or vital, the unanimous consent
of all stockholders to their acceptance is necessary, (p. 811) * * * The next change proposed
is that the corporation shall have the right to
retire any and all of the preferred stock, at such
price as the corporation may agree upon with
the owner thereof, at such time as it my deem
proper. * * * There is no provision in the char38
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ter for the retirement of preferred stock. The
proposed amendment provides for the retirement of preferred stock. This is a radical change,
and requires the unanimous consent of the stockholders to become effective.''
Coombs v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 52 S. Ct. 435, 76 L.
Ed. 866:
"The authority of the state under the co-called
reserve power is wide; but it is not unlimited.
The corporate charter may be repealed or amended, and, within limits, not now necessary to define, the interrelations of the state, corporation
and stockholders may be changed; but neither
vested property rights nor the obligation of contracts with third persons may be destroyed or
impaired * # *."
Midland Co-op. Wholesale v. Range Co-op. Oil
Assn., 200 Minn. 538, 274 N.W. 624, 111 A.L.K. 1521:
"The articles of incorporation are the charter
of a corporation and, subject to the constitution
and laws of the state, its fundamental and organic law. * * # It is a contract between the state
and the corporation and among the corporators
inter se. * * * It evidences the contract by which
a stockholder binds himself. It measures and
determines the nature and extent of the powers
of the corporation, and defines and limits the
field of corporate activities and the rights, obligations and liabilities of the stockholders. # # #
The charter cannot be amended without the consent and acquiescence of all the stockholders unless the power of amendment is reserved. The
power to amend may be reserved by the constitution, statutes or articles of incorporation. The
reserved power to amend must be exercised within the limits of the reservation * * # . If the
39
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reservation is general and not limited in terms,
the reserved -power of amendment does not permit a change so fundamental as to change the
nature and purposes of the corporation * * V
Strout v. Cross A and I Lumber Co., 283 N. Y. 406,
28 N.E. (2d) 890, 133 A.L.R. 646:
4
'Preferred stock issued by a stock corporation may grant to the stockholder a variety of
rights depending largely upon the financial requirements of the corporation at the time the
stock is issued. Whatever preferential rights and
privileges may thus be granted to a stockholder,
the law regards them as contractual. 'The certificate of stock is the muniment of the shareholder's title, and evidence of his right. It expresses the contract between the corporation and
his co-stockholders and himself; and that contract cannot unwillingly be taken away from him
or changed' * * *."
Fidelity Building and Loan Assn. v. Thompson, 51
S.W. (2d) 578, 599:
"The reserved right in the state to 'alter, reform
or amend' charters does not give the state the
right to destroy or impair the rights of shareholders to their interest in the property of the
corporation. If the state can destroy or impair
the property rights of non-borrowing shareholders in the instant case by requiring them to
suffer all losses when their position was equal
with borrowing shareholders under the contract
by which they became shareholders, then the
state in any instance, and as to any corporation,
can impairand destroy the rights of shareholders
in the property thereof by legislation enacted
. after the contract is made."
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Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267
N.W. 815, 105 A.L.R. 1447, 1451:
"* * * it seems clear that the redemption right
of plaintiff as a preferred stockholder is something more and different in character than an ordinary incidental right of a stockholder, such as
voting for the election of a director, and that his
right is contractual in nature. The contract right
was presumably a condition precedent to plaintiff's determination to purchase preferred stock
in the defendant company. The redemption provision was a definite undertaking on the part of
the defendant corporation to redeem at a given
time and on given terms the stock plaintiff agreed
to purchase. Assuming, as we fairly may, that in
the absence of the redemption provision plaintiff
would not have purchased his stock, or that defendant 's undertaking to redeem was an inducing
cause in consequence of which plaintiff did purchase, the provision for redemption was something more than a mere incident to corporate relationship ; it was a definite contractual undertaking, the proposal for which antedated and consummation of which coincided with the purchase
of the stock by plaintiff; who prior to that time
was not identified with the corporation. This
being true, appellee's contention above noted is
not tenable. While it is quoted from a case
wherein the plaintiff was a creditor of, and not a
stockholder in, the defendant corporation, we
think the following statement of the Supreme
Court of the United States is applicable to the
instant case: [Quotation from Coombs v. Getz,
supra]."
Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co,, 35 Fed. (2d)
643,645:
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"We think this overlooks the true effect of the
existing promise to redeem in 1925. This promise
was authorized by statute, it was relied upon by
the investor, and we see no reason why it is not
essentially a contract beyond the power of the
corporation to change materially without the consent of the investor. It follows that the statutory
provisions for extension and the proceedings
here taken must be regarded as subject to the
performance of the duty created by this promise.
The power of the corporation to amend its articles
or its by-laws cannot extend to making a change
which would amount to a repudiation of a contract which is distinct from, and in addition to
all ordinary matters of internal management,
regulation and control."
The phrase "may be amended in any respect," contained in both the 1898 statute and the 1943 Code provision, does not confer unlimited and unrestricted power
upon the stockholders of a corporation. It is first limited
by the specific prohibitions or limitations prescribed in
the statutes themselves. (None, of which are pertinent
in this litigation.) The phrase is further and most cogently limited by the historical events which produced
the constitutional reservation of power to amend, alter
or repeal corporation laws and, also, by the underlying
purpose of such reservation and its implementing legislation. Without a specific directive to the effect that
such power may be exercised to alter or change the
relationship between a corporation and its stockholders
and between the stockholders inter se, the power to
"amend in any respect" should not be construed to include the power to impair or destroy a stockholder's
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rights of property in his shares. If it be accepted that
the statutory declaration operative at time of organization of the defendant authorizing the defendant to
amend its articles "in any respect" became part of the
articles in the same manner as if it were written therein,
it will be binding upon the plaintiffs only insofar as the
court may define the true substance and meaning of the
phrase "may be amended in any respect.'' If the court
refuses to adopt an interpretation granting majority
. stockholders unlimited power of amendment (subject
only to statutory restrictions), then such construction
of the statute is carried into the articles of incorporation
of defendant.
The right plaintiffs acquired in the purchase or acquisition of defendant's second preferred stock to own
and hold the same free and clear of the privilege of redemption by defendant was and is a most valuable
property right. The preference granted was not only
as to a guaranteed 6% dividend, but also included
preference on liquidation of the defendant. Plaintiffs'
shares, therefore, possess qualities which are ordinarily
not only those of common shares—that of permanency
of investment—but also qualities usually conferred upon
preferred shares—that of priority upon liquidation, and
of dividend payments. There is a combination of legal
and economic factors which are an integrated part of
the plaintiffs' property and property rights. (Judicial
notice may be taken of the notorious fact that noncallable preferred shares listed on the New York Stock
Exchange sell at a heavy premium.) Plaintiffs' owner43
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ship of defendant's second preferred shares includes a
unique proprietary interest in defendant's business arising out of both the priorities and preferences and the
permanency of the investment. The latter factor is, in
view of defendant's acknowledged financial success, a
vital element in fixing the value of the shares. A destruction of the element of permanency will immediately
destroy a definite and fixed part of the value of defendant's shares owned by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the
power of amendment should not be construed to include
the power to destroy this value.
It is difficult to believe that the people in adopting
the Constitution and the legislature in enacting legislation to implement this reserved power of amendment
intended to confer authority either upon the State or
upon corporations and their stockholders which would
enable the State or a majority of stockholders as the
delegatee of this reserved power to destroy the property rights of a minority group. This would indeed be
the "tyranny of the majority," and would represent
the exact opposite of the principle which has always
motivated the political philosophy of the United States
—that of protecting the minority from the unreasonable
or oppressive action of the sovereign power exercised
either by the legislature or by a majority of electors.
This principle is a fundamental tenet in our constitutional government, and a departure from it in construing the statutes in question could be justified only as
an exercise of the police power. It has never been
asserted that the exercise of this reserved power to
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amend corporation laws was an exercise of the police
power, and none is made in the case at bar.
It is therefore submitted that (1) the history of
the constitutional reservation of power to amend corporation laws and corporate charters; (2) a fundamental tenet in the political thought of the Nation with
respect to the relationship of minority and majority
groups; and (3) the decisions of courts and the opinions
of legal scholars, all support the conclusion that the
power to " amend in any respect" does not include the
right of the majority of defendant's stockholders to
destroy the valuable right of plaintiffs to own and hold
their preferred shares free from the threat of involuntary retirement of same.
II.
THE PHRASE "MAY BE AMENDED J N ANY
RESPECT," CONTAINED IN SEC. 338, R. S. 1898
AND IN SEC. 18-2-44, U. C. 1943, IS NOT UNLIMITED
IN ITS OPERATION AND MUST BE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY AN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION W H I C H W I L L P R O T E C T T H E
RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS FROM
OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF POWER BY THE
MAJORITY OF STOCKHOLDERS.
1. Changes in the rights of outstanding shares of corporate stock can be justified under said statutes only
when the exigencies and needs of the corporation require it.
2. The exercise of the reserved power to amend, alter or
repeal by a majority of stockholders of a corporation
should never be sustained when such exercise of power
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substantially impairs the rights of minority stockholders.
The phrase "may be amended in any respect" is
capable of a wide variety of interpretations, and the
decisions of the courts reveal differences which are
difficult to reconcile. However, leading jurisdictions
which hold that under this reserved power to amend
there is no vested right in the stockholders to maintain
their rights and privileges under the articles of incorporation or charter, nevertheless, definitely limit the
exercise of this power of amendment by the majority of
stockholders, and approve only amendments which can
be justified by an exercise of fair business discretion
and judgment or which the exigencies of business or
the financial condition of the corporation demands. Professor Ballantine of the University of California Law
School and author of California Corporation Law
writes in his 1949 Edition as follows:
"There are two main classes or types of
amendment which have consequences in the safeguards provided: first, those amendments which
have a similar effect on all the shareholders as a
body and make some change with respect to the
enterprise as a whole, such as a change of purposes; second, those amendments which permit
a specified majority to change the rights and
relations as between different classes of shares
and thus change the proportional rights of individual shareholders to participate in the enterprise. This latter type of amendment is the one
that has caused great trouble in the courts as to
what protection should be given against discrimination and abuses of power, particularly as respects preferred shareholders.
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"The safeguard primarily relied upon in
amending statutes for the protection of members
of a class of shares adversely affected by an
amendment is the right of a class vote. (Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280'
N. W. 688, 117 A. L. E. 1276; note, (1944) Wis.
L. Rev. 65, 66.) In California a two-thirds vote
is required, in other states the required percentages are about evenly divided between a onehalf and two-thirds class vote. There is some
variation in the specification of those amendments which are regarded as requiring a vote by
classes, particularly as to the creation of a new
class of shares having prior rights and preferences over an existing class, or an amendment as
to the purposes of the corporation.
This rule was applied in DeMello v. Dairyman's Cooperative Creamery, 73 C. A. (2d) 746, 167 Pac. (2d)
226. The following example is indicative not only of
the rule itself, but of its application:
"Mr. Ballantine in his California Corporation
Law (1938 ed.) at page 9 in section 7, comments
on the right of a corporation to change its financial structure as follows:
" 'Changes in the rights of outstanding shares
may be valid if they can be justified as an exercise of fair business discretion in meeting the
needs and exigencies of the corporate enterprise.
The more urgent the need or the emergency the
more drastic the amendment or adjustment which
fairness will permit, as in changing preferences
and financial arrangements according to what
the enterprise can carry. The facts and circumstances of each case will enter into the determination of the validity of the exercise of the
power in that case.'
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"The evidence in this case indicates that the
membership structure of the creamery had
caused internal dissension and was hampering
the corporation as well as compelling it to pay
out unnecessarily, considerable sums in federal
income taxes; that it was impossible to repay to
members the full value of their interests without winding up its affairs. It also appears that
all members were treated alike in the reorganization in so far as the valuation of the individual
interests are concerned as well as the repayment
of that valuation and that plaintiffs and their
assignors, had they consented to the reorganization plan, would have received $100 in cash,
which was the same amount they would have received from the creamery upon voluntary withdrawal from it, and in addition will receive $965
in deferred payments. There seems to be nothing
unfair in this procedure and it is intended to
settle the internal troubles of the association.
This brings the case within the rule announced
by Mr. Ballantine which we believe is a correct
summary of the law applicable here. Certainly
the reorganization plan did not violate any vested
contract or property rights held by plaintiffs so
it cannot be held to be unconstitutional on the
grounds urged by them."
This doctrine finds an interesting example in a
Canadian case entitled Re Western Grocers (1936;
Manitoba) 2 West. Week. Eet. 81, 2 D. L. E. 762. It was
proposed to amend the articles of incorporation to
render the preferred shares, which, as issued, contained
no provision for redemption, redeemable at par plus 10
per cent. It appeared that the company's preferred
shares were quoted on the stock exchange at $107 per
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share and the common shares at $49. The net worth of
the company was such that after the redemption of all
the outstanding preferred shares at $110 (such shares
having a par value of $100), sufficient assets would
remain to give the common shares a book value of
$85.98. The court wrote:
" I t is self-evident that the scheme is one calculated for the benefit of the holder of common
shares at a sacrifice of the preferred shareholders
of the loss of their investment. Is it such a
scheme as reasonable men of business might
pro-perly and reasonably approve? The court will
not sanction an arrangement unless it is fair and
equitable to all the parties interested. * * * The
opinion I have formed, and I feel that I ought
to express it, is that the strong financial position
of the company and the total absence of any
necessity for any assistance or protection and
the evident intent being to improve the position
of the holders of the common shares the injustice
to the preferred shareholders in depriving them
of the benefit to which, by risk of their initial
investment of the company, justly entitles them
to, leads me to the irresistible conclusion that this
is not the reasonable and fair scheme."
It appears that the jurisdictions which have established this test are operating under constitutional and
statutory 'provisions with reference to amendment of
articles of incorporation as broad as those of Utah, and
that these jurisdictions are committed to the doctrine
that the constitutional and statutory provisions existing at the time of incorporation are written into the
articles of incorporation as if set forth therein in
extenso. (Cf. 13 Am. Jur. Corporations, Sec. 90, p. 234.)
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Professor Ballantine 's doctrine as quoted in the DeMello
case, supra, is clearly indicative that the rule finds its
source in the well-established principle that a court of
equity possesses the power to protect minority stockholders against unjust and unfair action on the part
of majority stockholders.
" I t is well established that courts of equity
will entertain jurisdiction in the instance of
minority stockholders of a private corporation
who are unable to obtain redress within the corporation and have no adequate remedy at law,
to restrain, threaten ultra vires acts on the part
of the majority or to prevent any other act on
the part of the majority which may be denominated as a breach of trust or a breach of the
fiduciary duties owing to the minority." (13 Am.
Jur. Corporations, Sec 424, p. 476.)
If it be the conclusion of the court in the instant case
that the reservation contained in Section 338 of Revised Statutes 1898, which provided that the " articles
of incorporation * * * may be amended in any respect,"
is sufficiently broad to permit the alleged amendment
of November 10, 1947, the duty still remains upon the
court to determine whether or not the alleged amendment, considering all of the facts and circumstances of
this case, is a valid exercise of the reserved power of
amendment.
According to the Ballantine doctrine, after a court
has found the necessary reserved power in the State to
authorize corporate action which directly affects or
changes property and property rights of stockholders,
and has decided that applicable statutory provisions
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confer authority upon the corporation to alter or change
the stockholders' interests and rights, the courts are
still faced with the consideration of the fairness and
equity of the proposed scheme, although, of course, the
fairness of any plan cannot supply the necessary legal
authority to execute it.
A study of the court decisions" of the past 15 years
involving the same problems as are involved in this
case indicates that they have moved in cycles. Economic
and industrial demand, plus the chaotic situation incident to the financial upheaval of the 1930s, influenced
the courts to give an expansive interpretation of the
reserved power of amendment. However, this trend
now shows signs of being halted. When the emergent situation passed, it was seen that injustice was being inflicted upon innocent persons who had invested their savings
in corporate securities on the strength of argreements
contained in the articles of incorporation of issuing companies. These investors were subjected to loss of certain rights through the operation of this reserved power
of amendment. The legalistic reply that the investor
acquired his stock charged with knowledge of this reserved power of amendment did not meet the situation
where the reorganization plan was apparently unfair
or unjust. The courts commenced to draw back from
the idea that the fairness or unfairness of the corporate
action could not be considered where the action was in
exercise of power conferred upon the corporation by
the act under which it was organized. The reaction is
now making itself felt, and hence it is that the courts,
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after affirming the power, examined into the fairness
and equity of any plan.
The court in its decision in Havender v. Federal
United Corporation (1940), 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 At. (2d)
331, declared that the legal right of the company to
cancel the stockholders' claim to accrued, accumulated
dividends was subject to the qualification that such plan
was fair and equitable with the prescribed method to
secure such fairness. In 1947 the Federal Court, in
Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, (C. A. 3d Del.)
163 Fed. 2d 804, declared that in destroying the rights
inherent in shares of stock, the plan must meet the test
of a court of equity that it is not unfair, inequitable,
or fraudulent. The doctrine was again applied in Forges
v. Badsco Sales Corporation, 1943, 32 At. 2d. Del. Ch.
148. See also Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corporation, 136 Fed. 2d (C. A. 3d Del.) 944, for definitive
application of the rule. In the case of Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Company, 134 N. J. Equity 271, 35 At/
2d 215, 135 N. J. Equity 506, 39 At. 2d 431, the plan or
reorganization was declared to be so unfair and inequitable as to be illegal. The court in this case asserted
that the scheme was for the benefit ofthe common stockholders.
In another New Jersey Case, Kamena v. Janssen
Dairy Corporation (1943), 133 N. J. Equity 214, 31 At.
2d 200, 134 N. J. Equity 359, 35 At. 2d 894, the court, in
substance, concluded that the plan of reorganization
lacked an essential element of justice or equity because
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of the failure of the plan to make provision to condensate minority stockholders for their losses.
The requirement that a court examine a plan of
corporate reorganization or an amendment to the articles of incorporation affecting the stockholders' rights,
with the view of determing the necessity for such plan
and its effect upon stockholders, is a judicial safeguard
which is highly necessary if the reserved power of
amendment is to be construed as being comprehensive
and plenary. Such rule in no respect limits the power
of the State to supervise its corporate creatures, but it
does protect minority stockholders from over-reaching
by the majority group. It is a desirable curb upon the
will of the majority which protects the minority without
handicapping the State in the exercise of its proper
function, and without "straightjacketing" a corporation
which may be in financial difficulties and worth preserving. It is a salutary rule and one that commends
itself for its simplicity in application and its effectiveness in reaching the ends of justice. It correlates an
unlimited reserved power of amendment as a theoretical governmental function with the practical aspects
always involved in this type of case,
1. Changes in the rights of outstanding shares of corporate stock can be justified under said statutes only
when the exigencies and needs of a corporation require it.
There is no claim nor assertion in the pleadings in
this action that the defendant's financial condition is
other than sound. The plaintiffs alleged (R. 17) and the
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defendant admitted (K. 34, 35) that the value of the
fixed assets of the company is in excess of a million
dollars; that the value of the working capital and inventories is in excess of two million dollars; that during
the period of its existence the defendant has earned
large profits; that, except for current liabilities, it is
free from debt; and that its credit standing is among
the highest of all commercial and industrial concerns
doing business in the intermountain country. With these
admissions, the conclusion is free from all doubt that
the defendant on November 10, 1947, and at the time of
the commencement of this action was not only solvent
but, also, was a prosperous merchandising concern, earning large profits. Further, the pleadings do not reveal
that there is any internecine dispute or controversy
existing between the stockholders, directors, or officers
of the company, except for the present controversy. The
defendant has not denied, nor will it deny, the statement that in its present condition it is a superb example
of successful American industry.
Therefore, there is not presented by the pleadings
any situation similar to that described in the DeMello
case, supra, whereby the corporate structure had caused
dissension among the stockholders which had- hampered
the company's operations, as well as compelling it to
pay exhorbitant income taxes. There is not present in
the case any claims of creditors, and the record may be
searched in vain to discover any situation which demands a reorganization of the stock structure of defendant. Defendant admits:
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That at the present time it believes it can
borrow funds for financing its operations at a
rate of interest less than six (6) per cent per
annum, and upon that basis (if the class 2 preferred stock be retired), the source from which
dividends on common stock may be paid will be
increased somewhat." (R. 36.)
This admission explains the underlying purpose of the
alleged amendment of November 10, 1947.
The conclusion must be that there is disclosed on
this facet of the case no facts or circumstances which
demand that plaintiffs' stock ownership be modified or
changed. The company does not face insolvency or
liquidation. Its finances are in splendid condition and
there is nothing in the pleadings to disclose an emergency condition which demands radical treatment in
order to sustain defendant's business operations. The
only purpose for eliminating the class 2 preferred stock
is to reduce the interest charge on funds used in the
operation of the company. (R. 36.) Under the circumstances disclosed by the pleadings, the exigencies and
needs of the defendant do not require the elimination
of plaintiffs' preferred stock.
2. The exercise of the reserved power to amend, alter or
repeal by a majority of stockholders of a corporation
should never be sustained when such exercise of power
substantially impairs the rights of minority stockholders.
The defendant in its answer (R. 34, 35) to Paragraph IV of plaintiffs' third cause of action (R. 17) admitted the following facts:
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"That - the defendant company has for nearly
50 years last past engaged in the commercial
activities for which it was incorporated, with its
principal office and place of business in Salt Lake
City, Utah; that the business has expanded and
grown and defendant now owns and operates
large branches at Boise, Idaho, and Grand Junction, Colorado; that in said three cities it has
constructed, owns, occupies, and operates extensive warehouses and offices; that the value of its
fixed assets is in excess of a million dollars; that
its working capital and inventories are also
valued in excess of two million dollars; that during said period the defendant company has
earned large profits * * # . That, except for current liabilities, it is free from debt and its credit
standing is among the highest of all commercial
and industrial concerns doing business in the
intermountain country." (R. 17.)
The defendant in its answer admitted:
'i That during the period of 50 years last past,
the defendant company has paid regular dividends due upon its preferred and common stock,
except that during the years 1931 and 1932 it
paid no dividends on its common stock." (R. 35.)
Defendant further admitted that the dividend record of
the company has made its class 2 preferred stock a
desirable investment. (R. 35.)
These admissions show that the class 2 preferred
stock of the company holds a unique position in the
financial structure of the defendant. There were outstanding at the time of the special meeting of the stockholders on November 10, 1947, 11,961 shares of the
capital stock of the company, of which amount 10,135
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shares were common stock and 1,826 shares were class 2
preferred stock. The plaintiffs are the owners of 1,501
shares of the total of 1,826 shares of class 2 preferred
stock.
Here, then, is a corporation possessing assets and
properties of the approximate value of three million
dollars, free from debt, represented by 11,961 shares of
stock, and each share, therefore, possesses an equity
value of about $250.
While it is true that the class 2 preferred stock,
upon dissolution or liquidation of the company, will
only be entitled to $100 per share, the fact remains that
each share of preferred stock has an equity of about
$250 in the assets of the company to guarantee the annual dividend of six (6) per cent on par. It is manifest,
therefore, that so long as the company remains in operation and is not liquidated, that each share of class 2
preferred stock, if not subject to redemption, possesses
an inherent value in excess of its par value of $100.
With the acknowledged financial success of the company
over a period of nearly half a century and with a guaranteed dividend rate of six (6) per cent on par, the conclusion is irrefutable that these preferred shares occupy
a most distinguished investment position in the intermountain country. If they are non-callable and cannot
be redeemed, this aspect of their ownership is a substantial element of their value on the open market. The
guaranteed dividend of six (6) per cent, supported by
a $250 equity, and the fact that shares are not subject
to redemption produces an unusual and most profitable
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investment. It is obvious that the element of non-callability is one of the three dominant factors determining
the market value of this stock. If these shares are subject to redemption, as the defendant contends, then one
of the primary elements of value is totally destroyed.
These are facts reflected by the record, and the deduction is clear that the making of these shares redeemable
will take away from the preferred stockholders a real
and genuine element of value and property. The value
factors herein discussed are most pertinent and relevant,
and should not be ignored by the court. Whether the
non-redemption privilege is a "vested'' property right,
or whether it is a preferential privilege only, a realistic
analysis of the elements giving value to these shares
compels the conclusion that the elimination of the nonredemption privilege will substantially damage preferred
stockholders.
If, however, these shares cannot be redeemed at
the will of the defendant, the open market value of the
shares, in view of the successful financial history of the
company, will be substantially above par. On the other
hand, if these shares are redeemable, this premium will
disappear automatically and the value of the shares
will be but par or less. This situation calls for equitable
relief, in order to protect the investments of these stockholders against partial emasculation.
It is not difficult to imagine supposititious cases
which prove that the phrase "may be amended in any
respect" cannot be applied literally in determining the
validity of the alleged amendment of November 10,1947:
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(a) If, for example, the articles had been
amended to change the preference on the preferred
stock to $1.00 per share on liquidation instead of $100
per share, the result would be so shocking to the sense
of justice and fair play of the court that such amendment would be declared null and void.
(b) If, for example, the articles had been amended so as to provide that the preferred stock should be
redeemable at $1.00 per share instead of $100 per
share, the corporation being in its present financial
condition, it is certain that no court in the land would
sustain such amendments.
These examples are not far-fetched situations, if
the theory is adopted that the phrase in question is unlimited in its application and scope. Obviously, there
must be a limit beyond which a corporation cannot go
in exercising this reserved power of amendment. The
doctrine set forth by Professor Ballantine has direct
and immediate application in order to prevent abuse
of power by the majority of stockholders.
The examples given and the alleged amendment of
November 10, 1947, while differing in degree in their
impact on the preferred stockholders' rights, are in the
same category. If the defendant can change non-redeemable preferred stock to redeemable preferred stock,
there is no limit to the power of the majority of stockholders (whether it be a simple majority or a two-thirds
majority or a three-fourths majority). The court should
refuse to accept a literal reading of the questioned
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phrase and assert the right of examining the surrounding facts and circumstances in each case to determine
whether or not an amendment meets the test of fairness,
justice, and equity. If this rule is adopted in Utah, it
is submitted that the alleged amendment of November
10, 1947, cannot stand, because it represents an abuse
of power of the majority of stockholders.
Plaintiffs, in submitting the foregoing argument in
support of their contention that the phrase "may be
amended in any respect'' cannot be applied literally,
take cognizance of two decisions in the Supreme Court
of Utah relating to and construing the reserved power
of amendment of articles of incorporation. Reference
is made to the following decisions: Salt Lake Automobile Company v. Keith O'Brien Company, 45 Utah 218,
143 Pac. 1050; and Weed v. Emma Copper Company,
58 Utah 524, 200 Pac. 517. The defendant in the lower
court relied heavily upon these two cases to support its
contention that its alleged amendment of November 10,
1947, was a valid exercise of the reserved power of
amendment.

t

The Salt Lake Automobile Company case involved
an amendment which created a new class of preferred
stock having priority over a previous preferred issue
and the common stock of Keith O'Brien Company. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the issuance of the
new preferred stock. The following quotation from the
decision in this case strikingly reveals the underlying
reasoning for the court's decision upholding the validity
of the amendment:
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" I n no event has a preferred stockholder a specific lien upon the assets of the corporation. At
most he has but a conditional promise or obligation of the corporation to pay, and in case the
corporate business is discontinued, and its affairs
are wound up, he, as against the common stock,
or inferior classes of preferred stock, may be, and
ordinarily is, entitled to preference. He, however, by reason of the right to amend and change
the articles of incorporation, takes his stock subject to such right. In the very nature of things,
therefore, the issue and sale of preferred stock
cannot affect the rights of stockholders, whether
holders of common or preferred stock, in a
greatly different way than such right is affected
by the issue of promissory notes or other unsecured obligations. Such obligations do not, as
against the company or its creditors, constitute
liens like mortgages.
i
' In the case at bar no one could have doubted
the right of the company to secure funds by
mortgaging its assets, if it were done in good
faith to protect its credit or to further its business interest. Had it done so, appellant's stock
and his right to dividends would have been subject to the indebtedness so created and secured,
whether it were large or small. Are his legal
rights or the value of his shares of stock affected
in a different way or to a greater extent by the
issue of the Class A stock than would have been
the case by the issue of bonds, or even by the
giving of promissory notes secured by mortgage
upon the property of the company? * * * If to
amend the articles of incorporation so as to issue
preferred stock and to classify the same invades
a constitutional right, then, of course, a business
rival who is a stockholder may prevent the amendment without giving his consent, and no one could
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complain. If, however, to so amend the articles
does not invade such a right, then he may not
complain, although it may affect the value of his
stock. The latter might be the affect upon his
stock in case of a mortgage or other pledge of
the corporate property to secure a debt, and yet
no one contends that he could prevent the giving
of a mortgage, if necessary to raise funds, and of
the necessity to do so the governing body of the
corporation, if acting in good faith, would ordinarily be the judge. No one doubts that a majority of the stockholders could authorize a loan and
a pledge of the corporate property to secure its
payment."

The Weed case involved the power and authority
of Emma Copper Company to convert non-assessable
shares into assessable shares by amending its articles
of incorporation. In sustaining the company's right to
do this, the court wrote:
" I n arriving at such conclusion we are not
unmindful of the plaintiff's contention that fully
paid stock is the property of the stockholder and
that by forfeiting the same his property rights
are affected. The contention to our minds is,
however/not applicable here. If, for example,
the corporation is indebted and no assessments
may be levied to raise funds to pay such indebtedness, judgment may be obtained against it and
all of its assets sold to pay the same. It might
just as logically be contended, therefore, that that
4
may not be done because it deprives the stockholder of his interest in the corporation and thus
affects his private property rights. His stock
merely represents whatever interest he may have
in the property or assets of the corporation. If
the corporation has no property or assets, or is
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insolvent, his stock is necessarily worthless. If,
therefore, an assessment is levied upon his stock
to pay debt and he and the other stockholders
fail to pay the same and the property of the corporation is sold to satisfy the indebtedness, each
stockholder is precisely in the same situation,
and no worse, than if his stock is forfeited for
non-payment of the assessment." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Supreme Court, in these decisions, used as its
measuring rod the economic aspect of the situation with
respect to corporate debts and the rights of creditors.
It is earnestly suggested that in both of these cases the
court reached the conclusion that no contract or property rights of the plaintiffs were being impaired or destroyed by the corporate action involved, because those
contract and property rights could be impaired or destroyed through creditors' action which, theoretically,
at least, could be prevented by the sale of preferred
stock (as in the Salt Lake Automobile Company case),
or by levying of assessments (as in the Weed case).
It is significant that in both of these decisions the court
in principal part justifies its conclusion that no substantial contract or property rights of the plaintiffs were
affected by introducing into its line of reasoning the
rights of creditors. It would seem that the court has
already committed itself to Professor Ballantine's doctrine and has not attempted to read and apply the
phrase "may be amended in any respect'' literally. Had
that been the process of the court, it could have quickly
reached its decisions in both cases by declaring that the
phrase contemplated any and all kinds of amendments,
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regardless of their effect upon minority stockholders.
It did not follow this course of reasoning, as it apparently sensed the fact that a situation could, or would,
arise where such overall interpretation would result
in grievous wrong being inflicted upon dissenting stockholders if it opened the gates to unlimited amendments.
(Note the emphasized sentence in the passage from the
Weed case.) Accordingly, the plaintiffs assert that the
holdings of these two decisions do not foreclose the Supreme Court from giving affirmative assent to Professor Ballantine's doctrine, in that these decisions may
be easily explained as being but one aspect of the whole
problem. There will be nothing inconsistent in the position of the court if it holds that the amendment involved
in this action is invalid because of its unfair effect upon
the plaintiffs' rights in the absence of any economic
factor involving the financial stability of the defendant.
Bather, such conclusion will be consistent with the position of the court exhibited in the two decisions above
discussed, as it will consider the need of a corporation
to effect a proposed amendment and its ultimate repercussion upon the stockholders. It is further relevant to
mention the fact that the amendment approved in the
Salt Lake Automobile Co. case affected all of the common
stock and all of the second preferred stock, equally, and
that the amendment approved in the Emma Copper Company case affected all of the outstanding shares of stock
of the company equally. There was no discrimination in
either case against any class of stockholders. In the
case at bar the alleged amendment is aimed directly at
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the second preferred stockholders and affects only their
rights.
By a supplemental answer (R. 39, 40), the defendant alleged that on March 16, 1948, at a special stockholders' meeting, an amendment was adopted extending
the life of the corporation by a period of five years, and
that the stock owned by the plaintiffs was represented
at that meeting and voted in favor of the amendment.
The holding of the Supreme Court in Fower v. Provo
Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, 99 Utah 267, 101
Pac. (2d) 375, that laws in force at the time of the extension of the corporate life of the company forms a part
of the contract between the corporation and its stockholders, does not in any respect influence or impair
the arguments of plaintiffs herein made. The provision
of Section 338, R. S. 1898, is the same as is found in
Section 18-2-44, Utah Code 1943. Therefore, if the 1898
provision is wholly ignored, the 1943 Code section becomes controlling. Plaintiffs' contentions, as herein
made, are applicable and equal to both statutes. Needless to state, if the November 10, 1947, amendment is
invalid, it would be invalid from its inception and
would form no part of the articles of incorporation of
the company. As a consequence, the action of the plaintiffs in voting to extend the corporate life of defendant
in no way changed their position nor impaired their
right to question in this action the 1947 amendment.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully submit that
the court should declare that the alleged amendment of
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November 10, 1947, of defendant's articles of incorporation is invalid and void.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER
ASHBYD. BOYLE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
Suite 312 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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